

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In the field of International Communism, the role of SRS once recognized by the components of the Agency, should play ^{a general role in the} ~~the role of one in the general~~ political-economic-military fields. It should bring together and evaluate all the information that has become available from the DDP, the DDI and OIR sources.

In addition, it should support planning functions in the Agency that are concerned with countering Communism.

SRS differs with all other Agency - and US Government - units in that it combines an academic type of research with practical estimative analysis. Since it does not deal with current events, except those of immediate bearing on its subject (the 20th CPSU Congress), it can, with care, select and study available material and intelligence and allot itself sufficient time to work out its views.

Moreover, it strives to come to its conclusions not only by "normal", i.e. Western reasoning but also by filtering its projections through Marxist-Leninist concepts. ^{On} ~~On~~ the basis of this approach is ^{the} ~~knowledge and~~ conviction that US security has to contend not only, as in the ~~old times~~, with nations but with also with/world-wide organization of a secular religion which seeks to destroy the democratic way of life as we know it.

The presently prepared paper ^{post} "PRE-1956 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST STABILIZATION" is perhaps a good example for the SRS approach and the uniqueness of this approach in the US Government. The measures taken by Moscow and ^{helping} ~~helping~~ to re-consolidate the Communist Movement after the blows suffered in 1956 have been reported and commented on by all components of CIA and intelligence bureaus outside the Agency. However, the measures have been taken up one by one, isolated from their larger aspects, concerned ^{primarily} ~~only~~ with the ~~local~~ meaning. SRS is now trying to examine the causes, methods and ^{prospects} ~~chances~~ of the stabilization campaign, to connect individual measures into one integrated whole and to speculate on the possible success or failure of the campaign. Over and beyond the ^{analysis} ~~factual reporting~~ of political, economic or military facts in the various areas or organizations, we attempt to present the ~~maximized~~ ~~best~~ the ideological and psychological motives of the Communists, taking into account the intangibles as well as the tangibles in intelligence.

In a more modest range, SRS did the same ~~before~~ ⁱⁿ SRS 1 to 3; ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ a functional paper on what pertains mainly to Communist techniques and means of combatting Communism in the free world, SRS tries to connect these factors to ~~again~~ present a broad area-wide picture. See SRS-4 and the forthcoming SRS-5 which ~~is dealing~~ ^{will deal} with a forthcoming event (the Moscow Youth Festival) but puts it into a wide ~~scoped~~ view and will be followed by a more speculative paper on the effects of ideology and Communist psychology on Youth.

7

DOCUMENT NO. _____
 NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 1
 IT DECLASSIFIED
 CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S ©
 NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1992
 AUTH: HR 70-2
 DATE: 20 MAY 82 REVIEWER: 103430

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Points to be raised with the I.G.


1. The most important point seems to me to be a clarification of the concept of this Staff. It is a new concept within government bureaucracy and therefore demands a new yardstick of evaluation. It combines the practical with the theoretical; it is a bit of ONE and of MIT, with Planning Board characteristics thrown in. We should not be judged by either the I.G. or DDI or other top level executives as an "ivory tower" outfit. The quality of the Staff should be determined on the basis of the quality of output and not the quantity. The Staff is something very special - and it can only remain in existence if it is recognized by our superiors as such. That means that an entirely pragmatic approach to our evaluation would lead to wrong conclusions. We serve eminently practical purposes but the means to this end are unfamiliar and unusual. As a matter of fact, what we need is an educational campaign throughout the agency to make that clear. (Strangely, outside of the agency the concept of SRS has been understood better than inside.)

2. SRS is not only a staff producing papers, it is also supposed to advise. Too little advantage of our existence has been taken by the DCI, the DDI and others, incl. ONE. DDP/ICD, too, has taken no advantage of us to discuss matters. In intelligence, people who think that they know all the answers, are poor intelligence officers.

3. SRS is still being overlooked when it comes to invitations for briefings or debriefings of important persons. Example: Bohlen. *This goes especially for DDP arrangements.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

25X1A9a



crisis

Ad hoc papers - action - follow up -
consultation briefing on set

Research papers - training + note

Speculative judgments

Relation with

ICD

ONE

UCI

AD/D

I.G. - May 29 1957

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100040009-4

I)

MEMORANDA Forwarded to DD/I

(Samples)

Invitation to Sukarno to Visit the U.S

9 March 1956

Chinese Communist Reactions to the 20th Congress of the CPSU 28 March

Exploitation of Bombay Socialist Conference 26 October 1956

Propaganda Suggestions for North Korea and North Vietnam 8 November 1956

Proposed Research on Hungarian and Polish Developments 28 November 1956

Suggestions for the Exploitation of Nehru's Visit 28 November 1956

Effects of Soviet Repression in Hungary on Communist Parties 7 February 1957
in Italy and France

Comments on DD/P Paper on Italian Socialist Reunification 11 April 1957

Suggestions for a Propaganda Program Addressed to the Elite of the
East European Satellites 27 Apr 57

Speculation on the Advisability of Revising the US-Japanese Security
Treaty 27 May 1957

PUBLISHED SRS PAPERS

Modifications of Communist Doctrine at the 20th Congress of the CPSU

Proposed Program of Research on the 20th Party Congress

~~Some Basic~~ Communist Concepts (prepared for OCB)

The New International Communist "United Front" Offensive and the
Position of the Socialist Parties (SRS-2)

The 20th Party Congress in Retrospect: Its Principal Issues and
Possible Effects on International Communism (SRS-1)

"National" Versus International Communism: A Comparative Analysis (SRS-3)

Legal VS Illegal Status: Some Considerations Relevant to Banning A
Communist Party (SRS-4)

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100040009-4

Organization

5 Senior Analysts (D, C, L, S, CH)
2 Loan ^{25X1A9a} (Raffa, OCI, ^{loan} [REDACTED], FOD)
2 R.A.'s (CC, SD-Jot) ^{25X1A9a}
1 Admin off (BJ)

Total of slots - DDI ceiling
DDI - 6 slots - 7 people
JOT 1, OCI 1, FOD 1

Space

7 rooms - 2210 (8 desks)
1 room - central ([REDACTED]) ^{25X1A9a}

Requirements

12 persons (not counting the 2 loan)
= 12 slots for double slotting

5 Senior

5 RA

1 Admin

1 clerk

14 desks

= 5 additional (can probably be
obtained from ORR)

Contacts

Resistance Group

China group - G-2, ONI, DOD/P

25X1A9a

(monthly)

Secret

25X1A9a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

D-

Below are some of my thoughts for I.G:

25X1A8a

1. SRS is perhaps the only intelligence unit in the entire community capable of maintaining the widest possible range of direct working relations with all other intelligence elements. For example, I am now able to make personal contact, as needs arise, with FE elements in G-2, ONI, DDP (FE, [REDACTED]), ONE, ORR, BR, OCI, State/OIR, and BI. When this example and plus is applied to other members of our Staff, ~~it would be something to think~~ SRS ~~is~~ ^{looks} very valuable organization for DDI and DCI.

2. SRS also maintains ~~excellent~~ excellent consultation relations with many outside scholars under the best possible security arrangements. I do not think it is possible for any other component in CIA to be able to create and maintain such a working situation.

3. Because of this unique position, SRS is in ~~thampon~~ a better position ~~to~~ view the entire panorama of the Communist world and able:

- a) To make a continuous survey of Communist movement on a world-wide basis.
- b) To advise DDI and DCI in matters pertaining not only to ~~the~~ international Communism but also on some very sensitive political problems, which if not resolved in time, could give Communist useful opportunity.
- c) To concentrate in speculative activity on ideological questions and ~~be~~ able to point out pertinent ~~symptom~~ symptoms as well as possible means of counter-action.

Ch

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~